Managing Moral Motivations by Minkler, Lanse
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Economics Working Papers Department of Economics
March 2003
Managing Moral Motivations
Lanse Minkler
University of Connecticut
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers
Recommended Citation
Minkler, Lanse, "Managing Moral Motivations" (2003). Economics Working Papers. 200306.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200306
Department of Economics Working Paper Series
Managing Moral Motivations
Lanse Minkler
University of Connecticut
Working Paper 2003-06
March 2003
341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063
Storrs, CT 06269–1063
Phone: (860) 486–3022
Fax: (860) 486–4463
http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
Abstract
Firms confront three problems: (1) shirking (sub-optimal provision of effort),
(2) smooth transfer of knowledge, and (3) eliciting new knowledge. The mo-
tivations possessed by firm members are four: (a) instrumental rationality (i.e.,
self-interest), (b) moral motivations and integrity, (c) intrinsic motivations, and
(d) fairness motivations. The trick for the firm is to manage motivations in a way
that solves its particular problems. The purpose of this paper is to provide the
foundations for moral motivations and moral integrity, and to discuss the kinds of
problems that they can and cannot solve, particularly in context of the complex
motivational mix.
1Managing Moral Motivations
1.  Introduction
As the capabilities view of the firm matures, researchers have begun to turn their
attention to underlying motivations.  Initially not much was said on the matter, rather the
focus was (and to some extent still is) on the firm as a social entity in which knowledge is
coordinated and generated.  In contrast, the traditional theories centering on exchange,
the transaction cost and agency theories, have steadfastly adhered to the assumption of
material and/or strategic self-interest for workers and contractors.  Those literatures have
thus focused on incentive alignment under conditions of information asymmetries or
bounded rationality, with risk-aversion and asset specificity posing extra complications.
The problem is that mounting experimental (and other) evidence suggests that economic
agents don’t behave the way agency and transaction cost theorists assume they do even in
far more sterile settings, that is, contrived experimental settings devoid of meaningful
social interaction amongst familiars (Sally 1995; Ledyard 1995).  Since the behavioral
assumption is key for those literatures, the evidence is particularly damaging.1
What about capabilities theories?  In an interesting contribution, Kogut and
Zander (1996) suggest that firms can best be understood as social communities that create
and transfer knowledge that is embedded in the competencies of individuals and
organizing principles of work.  Firms must create the "discourse and learning that
promotes innovation and motivated behavior."  While firm members are self-interested,
they also long to belong, which means that identity through association is important.
Identity further implies certain rule-based and moral norms which come to characterize
the social nature of the firm.  That leaves the door cracked for managing different kinds
of motivations.  Osterloh, Frost and Frey (2002) move the idea forward by suggesting
that the firm confronts the particular social dilemma of preventing members from free-
                                                
1  One of the transaction cost school's biggest proponents, Oliver Williamson, curiously admits that (in
contraposition to the assumption always invoked):  "People usually will do what they say (and some will do
more) without self-consciously asking whether the effort is justified by expected discounted net gains. "
(Williamson 1996, p. 49).  But he believes that no other assumption than opportunism can take us as far in
understanding the structure of economic organization.   Capability theorists might disagree, but the point I
want to make is that all theories will benefit by a more realistic characterization of workplace behavior.
2riding on firm-specific pool resources--- club goods like "corporate culture, mutual
commitment, common organizational rules and routines and accumulated firm specific
knowledge, or absorptive capacity as widely discussed within the knowledge-based
theories of the firm."  In their view, techniques like monitoring that act only on extrinsic
motivations will not work.  Instead, inducing members to share their knowledge may
require participatory and interesting work processes that otherwise act on intrinsic
motivations (i.e., work for its own sake).   The trick for the firm is to manage motivations
in a way that strikes a balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations.
But even that characterization is too simple.  Firm members may also hold truly
moral motivations, particularly in the sense that they can be counted on to do what they
agreed to do.  The existence of moral integrity implies that shirking may not be the
problem traditional organizational theorists think.  Integrity also adds a new avenue for
capabilities theorists because it provides a way out of social dilemmas.  Thus, members
of integrity would keep their word about not shirking, as well as not free riding on firm-
specific pool resources.
The task ahead for the capabilities literature is to incorporate a more complex
view of motivation into its analyses, one that adheres to the methodological principle of
realism in assumptions.  Intrinsic motivations are currently getting a hearing.  My aim is
to introduce moral motivations and the types of problems they solve so that they can be
fully integrated into the mix.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next
section provides the basis for moral motivations and integrity.  To do so I draw heavily
from philosophy.  The section also introduces the important notion of mutual deceit and
discusses the necessity of sincere workplace agreements to effectuate moral motivations.
The third section presents contributions from the fairness literature and illustrates the
complex motivational roles it can play.  The fourth section reviews the evidence from a
variety of literatures on incentives, and moral, intrinsic, and fairness motivations.  The
fifth considers the three types of problems and four types of motivations firms confront,
and discusses the task of managing motivations.  The conclusion offers some
speculations on what types of firm structures might best enable the full range of
motivation management.
32.  Identity, Moral Principles, and Integrity
Peoples' identities are determined by how they define themselves.  Economists
define people by their preferences and utility functions.  Homo Economicus is committed
to the principle that his own preferences, whether they include others' welfare or not, are
what counts and that his identity stops at his own skin.  In contrast, social scientists and
organization theorists have explored wider notions of self-definition that includes
membership in groups (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1996; Wenzel 2002).  The idea is that
some people have a larger notion of self and commit to adopting group goals as their
own, no matter if their own preferences conform or not.  It this account, people can
identify with many larger groups to one degree or another and their decision processes
are framed as such.  But even that expanded notion of identity formation is incomplete
because people can also identify with principles.  Principles are codes purported to be
true that prescribe and prohibit certain behaviors.  Individuals can embrace certain
principles so strongly that they come to define themselves through those principles.
People who identify themselves as honest or temperate or as pleasure seekers need not
refer to or identify with particular groups.  The account of integrity I offer is based on this
last kind of identity formation.
The first task is to find a widely held principle relevant for organization members.
In what follows I argue that the principle "not lying" not only qualifies, but also is central
to the notion of integrity.
According to Bok (1995) a minimalist interpretation of morality acknowledges
that all groups must work out basic values of (1) positive duties of care and reciprocity,
(2) negative injunctions concerning harm, betrayal, and deceit, and (3) norms for what
counts as just.  Additional principles can be included on a maximal interpretation, but that
invites all kinds of disagreements and charges of cultural imperialism.  Nor does one
need to agree with Bok's reasoning that the basis for the minimalist interpretation rests in
human survival and coexistence to adopt it as a sound framework.  It is sufficient that all
major ethical and religious doctrines speak to these values, as do all human societies.
The first category can be roughly categorized as including moral sentiments (and
perhaps the feminist notion of an ethic of care as well) and refers to the obligation to care
for children, the sick and the weak, and the reciprocity of gratitude towards kindness.
4The second can be categorized as ethics (or moral philosophy) and refers to injunctions
(or negative obligations) against violence, lying, breaches, and theft.  The third category,
usually the domain of political and legal philosophy, refers to processes adjudicating
disputes and determining what is considered fair.  I use Bok's second category as the
source of the principle ascribed to at least some firm members, and focus on the third
category for a later discussion on fairness.    
Lying is "any intentional deceptive message in the form of a statement" (Bok,
1978, p.15).  Both intent and deception are necessary.  A promise-breaker may not
initially intend to break a promise, but may subsequently do so if circumstances change.
If a promisor intends to break a promise at the time of the promise, perhaps out of
strategic motives, he is also a liar.  Lying is unethical because it coerces people to act
against their will.  It also breaks down societal trust by calling into question the reliability
of promisors.  For our purposes, lying is important because of its relationship to shirking.
If a firm member agrees to do something (e.g., provide effort, not free-ride on firm-
specific pool resources) while never intending to do so, he is a not only a shirker or free-
rider, he is also a liar.  Economists have tended to shrug off such broken agreements as
merely instrumentally rational, but morality says otherwise.2
Is lying ever justified?  Immanuel Kant and some theologians like St. Augustine
say no. Kant argues that lying always violates the moral law, as discovered through the
categorical imperative: act in such a way that one can will the maxim of one's action to be
a universal law.  Therefore, it would be wrong for me to make a promise with the intent
of breaking it (i.e., lie), because if it were a universal law that people made promises they
do not intend to keep, promises would be impossible, and I could not will such a state.
Most philosophers and theologians are not so unconditional.  For instance Utilitarians
argue that if by the act of lying one could bring about positive net consequences then one
should do so.  One could also ask:  Should one lie to liars?  Should one lie to prevent
some harms?  And, should one lie to a spouse in order to make thi/her feel good,
especially if both partners recognize it as such and agree to engage in mutual deception?
Bok (1978) addresses all of these questions and suggests that the answers depend on their
justifications.  She argues that justifications must be able to withstand public scrutiny by
reasonable persons.  On this account, lying to liars in order to exact revenge, as one
would do in certain fairness or tit-for-tat strategies in game theory, would not be
                                                
2   In fact, Kant has quite a different notion of rationality.  On his view it is our capacity for rationality
which requires us to follow moral law, not lying being a chief obligation.
5justified.3  Lying to prevent harm may be justified.  And lying in cases of mutual deceit
for reasons of spousal affection, in recreational games like poker, and even in some
buyer-seller relationships are indeed justified.  The issue of mutual deceit is pivotal and
the question of whether the firm can be seen as an arena of mutual deceit will be
considered shortly.
2.1  Integrity
At its coarsest level, a person of integrity can be thought of as one who is honest
and of character.  Philosophers probe deeper.  The Oxford Companion to Philosophy puts
it this way:
To have integrity is to have unconditional and steady commitment to moral values and
obligations.  For such a person, the fundamental question whether to conduct life on the
plane of self-concern or of moral seriousness has been decisively resolved, though
particular life situations will doubtless continue to put that commitment to strenuous test.
This moral commitment becomes a crucial component in his or her sense of identity as a
person: it confers a unity of character… (p.410)
Similarly, McFall (1987) defines integrity as identity-conferring commitments to
principles.  Commitments are internal requirements or constraints imposed on oneself
(see, for instance, Halfon 1989; Harcourt 1998). Qualifying principles can be either moral
(e.g., don't lie) or not (e.g., art for art's sake).  Being committed prevents one from
considering certain alternatives one might prefer.  So commitments are different than
preferences.  In economics, preferences are exogenously determined desires.  In contrast,
commitments are the product of conscious reflection.  The distinction is crucial because
the aim of economic man is to expeditiously fulfill desires in order to achieve maximal
happiness, while one who is committed to principles doesn't necessarily have such a goal.
Commitments and desire can conflict, but the person of integrity is obligated to choose in
favor of the former.4
                                                
3  For instance, Rabin (1993, p. 1281) writes: "If someone is being nice to you, fairness dictates that you be
nice to him.  If somebody is being mean to you, fairness allows-- and vindictiveness dictates-- that you be
mean to him."  This passage illustrates how certain conceptions of fairness may not be particularly moral.
4  Minkler and Miceli (2002) construct a simple two-stage game amongst agents differentially endowed
with integrity.  In the first stage agents randomly couple and promise to cooperate or not in the second
stage.  In the second stage agents either keep or break their promises.  It turns out that if there is sufficient
6Integrity is more than moral identity.  Integrity requires coherence between
commitments and action and between the commitments themselves (McFall 1987).  A
person of integrity must uphold commitments against temptation for reasons the agent
takes to be sound.  For McFall, one possesses personalintegrity if one holds identity
conferring commitments and meets the coherence criteria.  One further exhibits mo al
integrity if one possesses personal integrity but also commits to moral principles.  There
is no guarantee that agents will choose the right principles for the right reasons, but
virtually all moral philosophy and religious doctrines endorse the principle of "don't lie,"
and one who adopts that principle as his own can be said to possess moral integrity so
long as coherence is also satisfied.  He may violate the principle to prevent some great
harm, but he would not coherently differentiate between lying to left-handed and right-
handed people, say.  Nor could a person of moral integrity exhibit consistently honest
behavior at home while consistently stealing at work.  Coherence requires consistency, so
in order for an agent to maintain integrity in the face of what appears to be inconsistent
choices, the agent must be engaging in self-deception (Konow 2000) or participating in a
context of mutual deceit.
Why would a person of integrity act on moral principles?  There are two reasons,
one a cognitive one from philosophy stemming from "internalism," the other from social
psychology focusing on meaning.
The question for moral philosophers is: even if an agent recognizes a (minimalist)
moral principle as right, does that give him reason to act on it?  Moral philosophers
distinguish between internal and external reasons (see, for instance, Nagel 1978).  In the
first case, the truth of the ethical proposition provides (or the agent believes it does) the
moral justification for acting.  Externalism, in contrast, holds that reasons for acting are
based on the agent's own interests; the truth or perceived truth of moral propositions are
insufficient by themselves to motivate action.  If an agent believes lying to be wrong, but
could otherwise benefit from a lie, say it would increase his utility, internalism would
                                                                                                                                                
initial integrity in the population, all agents make promises to cooperate in the first stage.  In the second
stage three groups endogenously emerge: some always keep their promises, some always lie, and some
behave conditionally.  The existence of integrity otherwise enhances the level of cooperation in a social
dilemma setting.
7give reason to not lie, whereas externalism on these facts would not.  A person of
integrity thus has (internal) reason to act on those principles he holds to be true.
 Social psychologists have often equated well-being with happiness and its source
in efficacy.  Efficacy refers to doing well, or, more formally, to the likelihood of one's
personal projects being successful.  But that is only one aspect of well-being.  McGregor
and Little (1998) identify and provide evidence for "meaning" as another.  Meaning
refers to "being yourself" and to feelings of purpose, connectedness, and growth.  In order
to achieve meaning the authors posit that people try to make their projects consistent with
core aspects of themselves, which is just the notion of coherence in integrity already
discussed.  Moral principles are one kind of project, and thus meaning gives the person of
moral integrity reason to align those principles with her core identity and to act on them,
quite apart from any happiness considerations.  Indeed, one who experiences meaning
needn't be happy (and vice versa).
2.2  Mutual Deceit and Moral Standing
As mentioned, games of poker, so called "white lies" for spousal affection, and
buyer-seller interactions all qualify for contexts of mutual deceit.  According to Bok
(1978), what's critical is that the agents know the rules of the game -- meaning that lying
is acceptable behavior, and also that each consents to those rules.  A person of integrity
does not suffer diminishment by lying wildly in a poker game.  All involved know that
misrepresentation is possible and morally permissible.  In some buyer-seller contexts it is
well understood that sellers will exaggerate their products attributes and their ability to
lower price while buyers will understate their willingness-to-pay.  Incumbent blustering
about post-entry behavior to potential entrants in entry games surely represents mutual
deceit.  Many bargaining situations seem to have at least elements of mutual deceit.
The question is: are firms arenas of mutual deceit?  The old Soviet adage "we
pretend to work, they pretend to pay us" colorfully characterizes the concept.  If firm
members attribute moral standing to the firm and its other members, violations of
agreements without some other compelling reasons then impose a loss of integrity and
discordant identity and meaning.  Stated differently, persons of moral integrity, persons
8who coherently identify with and commit to the moral principle of not lying, have reason
to keep agreements in their firms if they do not view the context as one of mutual deceit.
In the context of the firm, there are three possibilities regarding workplace agreements,
each of which bears differently on member integrity.  First, firm members could believe
that agreements exist and are important to honor because others have moral standing.
Second, members could believe that agreements exist but are not important to honor
because of mutual deceit.  Third, members could believe that no workplace agreements
exist, and thus performance, to the extent it exists, must arise for other reasons.  Consider
each in turn.
The first case mirrors in some respects the relational contracting found in
organization theory (Rousseau and Parks 1993).  Relational contracts are characterized in
part by loyalty, long-term mutual commitments and fair dealing.  In my framework those
elements provide a prima facie case for the continued moral standing of the other, and
hence people keep agreements because of their moral motivations.  In particular, fairness
by the other party indicates their sincerity and moral concern, and a person of integrity
could not reasonably rationalize the relationship as one of mutual deceit.  Thus in my
framework fairness plays an instrumental role, it operates through mutual deceit rather
than the moral principles underlying integrity.  I will discuss this issue in more detail in
the next section.
The second case, where agents believe that workplace agreements exist but are
not important to honor because of mutual deceit, appears similar to the agency and
transaction cost characterizations, but really is not.  In those frameworks agents may
agree to honor an agreement without ever really intending to (if they could get away with
it) because such a promise would be contrary to their own interests (leisure over effort),
and thus instrumental rationality dictates non-performance over promises.  In contrast,
the person of integrity may break a promise because either she does not believe the rules
of the game require it, or because she does not believe the promisee possesses moral
standing.  The first possibility arises if the agent otherwise ascribes moral standing to the
promisee, but believes agreements within the organization as something akin to games of
poker where notions of advantage and winning dominate.  The second possibility occurs
if the agent does not ascribe moral standing to the promisee and hence does not think
9agreements important to honor.  That case would be akin to lying to a liar for reasons
other than revenge, where the latter does not deserve moral consideration.  Breaking a
promise might be seen as justified punishment.  Either possibility, however, diverges
from the one stemming from instrumental rationality because the solutions are different.
In the agency and transaction cost frameworks, performance requires incentive
alignment.  Here, the solution working on integrity requires the elimination of mutual
deceit, independently of the incentive structure.
The last case refers to situations where no perceived agreements exist.  Even
though the agency and transaction cost literatures use the language of (made) contracts,
this is the case most germane.  To the extent agent integrity exists, it is simply not
relevant.  Performance could still occur though incentive alignment or by operating on
intrinsic motivations, for instance, but in order for integrity to become a motivating
influence, agreements would need to be articulated, understood, agreed to (at least
implicitly), and the moral standing of the other recognized.
3.  Fairness
Economists typically invoke reciprocity, real or anticipated, for their notions of
fairness (Rabin 1993).  In contrast, those working in psychology and social psychology
have identified three different types of fairness (sometimes referred to as "justice"):
distributive, procedural, and interactional (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001).  The first
focuses on the perceived fairness of outcomes (e.g., income and promotion distribution in
organizations).  Perceived unfair outcomes are expected to affect a person's emotions
(e.g., anger) and cognitions, which in turn affects their behavior.  Procedural fairness, in
contrast, focuses on the perceived fairness of the process determining outcomes.  A fair
process is consistent, unbiased, accurate, prone to corrections, inclusive, and ethical.  The
last, interactional, refers to the perceived fairness of interpersonal interactions by
particularly focusing on polite, honest, and respectful communications.5
                                                
5   Interactional fairness might be closely related to the reciprocity notions found in economics.  Examples
of those most closely aligned with distributive fairness might include Konow's (1996) focus on allocations
varying in proportion to one's contribution, and Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) focus on inequity aversion.
10
All types of fairness, distributive, procedural, and interactional, sincerely
exhibited by another contributes to their moral standing.  This recognition is a cognitive
problem, not a social one (Landy and Becker 1987 ).  Thus where sincere fairness occurs,
mutual deceit rationally does not.
Let me briefly summarize the argument so far.  People of integrity construct their
identity through moral principles and thus have reason to act on those principles.  A
minimalist moral principle relevant for organizations is "don't lie," meaning that an agent
would have reason not to shirk if she promised not to do so.  Still, persons of integrity
might engage in promise breaking if the context were one of mutual deceit, where the
promisee lacks moral standing for instance.  However, if the promisee herself is acting
fairly, mutual deceit cannot be rationalized and the person of integrity has reason to keep
her agreements.
In this account the role for fairness is indirect.  Fairness can also play a more
direct role in different kinds of identity formation.  For instance, Kogut and Zander (1996
p. 503) suggest that "firms provide a sense of community by which discourse,
coordination, and learning are structured by identity."  For those authors, our employment
gives us one of our most important identities, and this identity has important implications.
It provides organization members a shared cognitive model of the world which improves
coordination, communication, and learning and ultimately promotes motivation and
innovative behavior.  Since organizations are social communities, norms of fairness
influence individual behavior.  While not explicit, the further implication seems to be that
organizations not successful in following fairness norms would experience the kinds of
transactional contracts found in the economics literature with their attendant motivational
properties.  So members identify and act fairly with fair firms, but act more self-
interestedly and identify less with those perceived as unfair.  Wenzel (2002) likewise
attributes identification with common groups, which means that members will be
concerned with their status within the group and hence prone to follow group fairness
norms.
                                                                                                                                                
Studies related to procedural fairness include: not exploiting fortuitous circumstances (Kahneman et al.
1986) and equal division of gifts (Frey and Bohnet 1995).
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Fairness considerations could also influence members who identify with other
individual members.  Brockner (1988 p. 224) outlines the argument in his study of
members who survive layoffs as follows: "if party A identifies with party B, and if party
B has been treated unfairly by some external agent then party A may seek to redress party
B's unfair treatment by retaliating against the external agent."  This idea is conceptually
distinct from those focusing on either identification with the collective as a whole, or
with moral principles.
There has also been a lot of work done on the role of fairness on member
performance without making reference to identity formation.  Cohen-Charash and
Spector's (2001) meta-analysis of the empirical literature already referred to nicely
summarizes the theoretical literature.  Distributive fairness is closely linked with equity
theory, and one hypothesis is that outcomes perceived unfair will cause behavioral
reactions aimed at particular outcomes.  In contrast, procedural fairness predicts cognitive
reactions toward the entire organization because that kind of fairness concerns the way in
which the organization allocates its resources.  Interactional fairness predicts attitudinal
reactions toward those in decision-making roles, like managers, because it is those whose
communications are being judged by members.
The relationship between fairness and motivations is complex.  It may enter (a)
indirectly and through identity formation based on moral principles (the account offered
here), (b) directly through group or individual identity relationships, or (c) directly
without any reference to identity at all.  Or the relationship may be any combination of
the three.  To get some clarity on this and other motivational determinants, I next
consider the evidence.
4.  Evidence on Motivations
This section reviews the evidence on four kinds of motivations: incentive, moral,
intrinsic, and fairness.  This section takes a brief look at each.
12
4.1 Incentives
While economists usually assume that incentives are the sole motivating factor
driving organizational members, little evidence exists to support the view.  As mentioned
in the introduction, the experimental evidence from social dilemma (and dictator and
ultimatum) games seriously challenges the idea that participants act solely on their
material self-interest.  An important empirical regularity is that very high cooperation
rates (typically over 80%) occur in repeated games with communication-- the context
most closely resembling organizational interactions (Sally 1995; Ledyard 1995).  Of
course even those experimental settings cannot replicate the identity issues and social
dynamics inherent in organizations.
Prendergast (1999) provides the most comprehensive literature review of the
underlying assumptions of agency theory, including the incentive one.  He does find
limited support for the incentive assumption in "simple jobs," those not exhibiting a team
nature necessitating joint contributions from different members.  Piece rate payment
schemes can boost salaries and productivity in windshield installation, Canadian tree
planting, and on an aggregate level, Chinese agriculture.  Prendergast further notes that,
contrary to the literature, the vast majority of employers do not use pay-for-performance
incentive schemes, instead opting for subjective performance evaluations to determine
pay, promotion, and training.  Nagin et al. (2002) analyze data from a telephone soliciting
firm and find that solicitor performance does decline for some members when monitoring
declines.  However, they also find that a substantial fraction are disinclined to shirk and
suggest that managers need to balance monitoring and incentives against fairness
considerations.  Again, their data covers a work setting where joint contributions are
unnecessary.
4.2  Moral Motivation
Since it has been little recognized, few (if any) attempts have been made to assess
the importance of moral motivation.  The experimental evidence on repeated games with
communication might seem indirect evidence, but it's not clear that moral rather than
13
some other motivation is responsible.  Sally's (1995) meta-analysis does indicate that
when experimenters elicit promises from participants cooperation rates do increase by
12-30%, depending on the regression model.  That result seems to confirm the
importance of a "don't lie" principle for many experimental participants.
Minkler (2002) provides evidence that workers are morally motivated. That study
employed a national U.S. survey of 1005 randomly selected participants who were asked:
"Suppose that it is almost impossible for your employer to check up on you.  Would you
say that you are very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely to
work hard if you agreed to?"  82.7% answered "very likely," 12.1% "somewhat likely,"
1.9% "somewhat unlikely", and 1.6% "very unlikely."  For those 94.8% in the "likely"
categories, the motivations in rank order were: (1) moral, (2) intrinsic, (3) peer-pressure,
and (4) positive extrinsic (e.g., promotion).  Negative incentives (monitoring) were
judged to be unimportant relative to a common anchor.  Regression analysis of the
variation in the likely group found that the higher the respondent's moral and intrinsic
motivations, the more likely it was they were to choose "very likely" to work hard.
The study also investigated the role of mutual deceit.  To gauge the extent of each
of possibilities suggested earlier, the survey included the following question (with mean
responses).
Q.  Some people think that employers agree to provide a good working environment , and
employees agree to work hard.  Which of the following comes closer to your own opinion?
a.  These agreements exist in the workplace and are important to honor.  66.1%
b.  These agreements exist but are not important to honor.  11.3%
c.  No such agreements exist in the workplace.  19.7%
Over 30% of the respondents judged the workplace to be either a context of mutual deceit
(b), or one where even basic agreements are absent (c).  Of the respondents who
answered (a) to the above question, 87.5% also answered "very likely" to the question
about working hard if they agreed to, versus 72.4% for those who answered (b) or (c).
While the evidence suggests that a very large percentage will keep agreements they
14
make, the number is higher for those who believe that such agreements do exist and are
important to honor.
4.3  Intrinsic Motivations
In contrast to incentive alignment, intrinsic motivations serve to fulfill one's needs
directly.  An intrinsic motivation occurs if an activity is undertaken "for its own sake"
(Deci and Ryan 1985).  In the workplace setting that means members work not just for
the indirect monetary rewards, but also for the direct satisfaction and fulfillment
provided.  A particularly interesting aspect of intrinsic motivation is its link to other
motivations, particularly external incentives.  Incentives might theoretically be structured
so as to "crowd-in" intrinsic motivation, amplifying its effect.  However, Osterloh and
Frey (2000) survey the literature and note that the preponderance of evidence suggests a
"crowding-out" effect, meaning a trade-off between the two (also see Frey 1997).  Those
authors attribute the crowding-out effect to two sources: the controlling aspect of
cognitive evaluation theory, and a reciprocal appreciation of intrinsic motivations
underlying psychological contract theory.  In the first, intrinsic motivation decreases if
the agent perceives that external interventions like pay-for-performance (e.g., incentive
contracts) shifts the locus of control from the agent to the principal.  In the second,
extrinsic compensation brings into question the reciprocal nature of members intrinsic
motivations, with an emotional reaction transforming the relationship into the kind of
transactional/ externally motivated one posited by economists.
As noted, Minkler (2002) also provides evidence for the importance of intrinsic
motivations.  Intrinsic motivation was represented by the response "I enjoy my work" as
a reason why people would keep their agreements to work hard.  That response was
second on the rank order and a significant determinant in the regression analysis.
Moreover, the response "my employer might catch me" was used both to check the power
of the monitoring (negative incentive) argument and also the crowding-out effect of
intrinsic motivation theory.  Once the respondent had placed themselves of having a
likelihood of keeping an agreement to work hard, the question becomes to what degree
would they do so because of employer monitoring?  It turns out that respondents not only
15
judged the factor to be unimportant relative to a common anchor, but also increases in the
response were negatively and significantly associated with increases in the likelihood of
keeping agreements to work hard.  In other words, those that thought the reason less
important were more likely to respond with a preference to keep their agreement---
supporting the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation theory.
4.4  Fairness
Significant evidence from different sources suggests that fairness considerations
influence organizational member behavior.  Consider a small sampling.
Cohen-Charash and Specter (2001) offer a meta-analysis most on point.  The
authors study the correlates of distributive, procedural, and interactional types of fairness
form 190 laboratory and field studies consisting of 64, 757 participants.  The evidence
suggests that each type of fairness is conceptually distinct, but that also each is highly
correlated with the others.  A key result finds that work performance was mainly related
to procedural fairness (mean correlation coefficient of .47 for 11 field studies with 2061
participants).6  Performance included measures of effort, official performance ratings, in-
role behavior ratings, and study specific performance measures.  Similarly, perceptions of
distributive and procedural fairness were negatively related to counter-productive work
behaviors (mean r= -.24 and -.29, respectively, for 3 field studies with 597 participants).
The authors also find that all satisfaction measures are strongly correlated with all
fairness types.  Finally, the organizational practices of voice, communication with
employees, organizational support, and pay raises were each significantly related with
perceived procedural and distributive fairness.  Evidently, organizations can intentionally
influence the perception of fairness through their practices and policies.
Researchers have also looked at the relationship between fairness and
"organizational citizenship behavior" (OCB).  Organ (1990 p.46 writes: "OCB consists of
informal contributions that participants can choose to proffer or withhold without regard
to considerations of sanctions or formal incentives."  Examples include constructive
                                                
6  Interestingly, the relationship is much weaker for procedural fairness and virtually non-existent for the
other types of fairness in laboratory settings.
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statements, interest in others' work, respecting housekeeping rules, punctuality and
attendance beyond standards, and refr i ing from expressing faults with others,
resentments, and complaints about small matters.  Organ (1990) hypothesizes that
fairness judgements are cognitions related to OCB and that employee participation can
legitimize procedural fairness.  Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) find some support for
the relationship between OCB and distributive fairness (mean r=.27 for 7 field studies
with 1688 participants) and procedural fairness ( mean r=.21 for 8 field studies with 1835
participants).
Evidence from survivorship studies indicates that fair treatment of those laid off
reduces the negative behavioral responses by survivors who strongly identify with the
newly unemployed (Brockner 1988).  Equity theory provides one possible explanation:
members try to attain and maintain fair relationships with their organizations.  If an
employer treats others with whom a member identifies unfairly, that reduces an outcome
associated with the organization and the member fairly responds by altering an input,
reducing performance in this case.7
5.  Managing Motivations
Firms confront at least three types of problems that must be managed.  The first is
the well known shirking problem of the principal-agent literature.  If agents are self-
interested and prefer leisure to effort, and if it is costly for principals to know agents'
contributions, then agents will shirk.  Depending on the information conditions,
transaction costs, and risk-preferences, the solution usually involves monitoring, positive
incentives (promotions, tournaments), and/or incentive contracts.  The next two problems
relate to managing knowledge.  Recall that Osterloh, Frost and Frey (2002) identify the
particular social dilemma of preventing members from free-riding on firm-specific pool
                                                
7  Minkler (2002) investigates the role of fairness in motivating members to keep agreements with their
organizations.  The question: "On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being not likely at all and 10 being very likely,
how likely is it that you would keep an agreement to do a good job if you know your employer to be
honest?" elicited a mean response rate of 9.69.  Employer fairness would seem to be very important to
respondents.  The reported intensity of the attitude was not a significant determinant in the likelihood of
keeping an agreement to work hard, however.  Wenzel (2002) provides evidence from social dilemmas and
tax compliance settings supporting the notion that social identity can transform social dilemmas and
enhance fairness motivations.
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resources.  Such free-riding impedes the value creating transfer or sharing of knowledge
within the organization.  While the authors may view efficient knowledge transfer and
sharing as the same thing, I will treat them differently.
What does it mean to free-ride on club goods like corporate culture, mutual
commitment, common organizational rules and routines and accumulated firm specific
knowledge?  That seems to me to be a crucial question largely unaddressed.  Consider
mutual commitment.  If someone free-rides on the commitments of others, that could
mean something like breaking an agreement to do certain tasks, thereby slowing or
otherwise subverting a project's completion.  It could mean slowing the transmission of
knowledge. How about free-riding on organizational routines?  That could mean violating
accepted rules for doing work tasks, since they are interrelated, meaning that others will
have to decode the non-conforming processes, which in turn could mean the slowing of
the transmission of knowledge.  Framed another way, consider the elements of a social
dilemma like a public goods game.  In such settings, the individual dominant strategy is
to withhold contributions.  But if too many do that then the efficient amount of the public
good is not provided and everyone receives lower, known, payoffs.  In the workplace
context, it means that members who do not make the effort to facilitate the transmission
of knowledge free-ride on the benefits of whatever stock of knowledge is available.  I
take this knowledge transfer problem to be the knowledge equivalent to shirking.   The
knowledge contribution in question is analogous to individual contributions in public
good games; everyone knows what contributions each could (and should?) make.  That is
the second problem that firms must manage.
A third, separable, problem concerns the sharing of knowledge.  I take the transfer
of knowledge to relate to some level of existing knowledge, where the inefficient transfer
of knowledge due to member free-riding reduces the stock of knowledge and hence its
payoffs.  Whatever its origins, knowledge that flows smoothly creates higher value, and
presumably that's one advantage of (efficient) firms over markets.  While sharing can
mean transfer, it can mean more.  I take sharing to mean an agent's co tribution or net
addition to the stock of existing knowledge.  It is one thing for an agent to participate in
the smooth delivery of knowledge, it is quite another for an agent to add to that
knowledge.  I discussed the latter at length in earlier papers on the contribution of firm
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member (particularly worker) ideas into the production process (Minkler 1993a and
1993b).  Ideas are knowledge surprises that can not be planned for in advance.  Returning
to the social dilemma characterization, productive new ideas and innovations further
increase payoffs (beyond that of smooth transfer) in unknown and unpredictable ways.
One could not pre-specify the payoffs from currently unknown ideas and innovations,
especially in a dynamic context.   Principal-agent analyses and real-life work structures
emphasizing known possible outcomes cannot adequately address situations where
knowledge is dispersed and firm members themselves are the sources of new knowledge.
If the need for this kind of sharing can be thought of as different from the need for
efficient transfer, a different kind of solution may be required.  It turns out that Osterloh,
Frost and Frey's (2002) analysis mostly relates to this third problem.
So firms confront three problems: (1) shirking (sub-optimal provision of effort),
(2) smooth transfer of knowledge, and (3) eliciting new knowledge.  The motivations
possessed by firm members are four: (a) instrumental rationality (i.e., self-interest), (b)
moral motivations and integrity, (c) intrinsic motivations, and (d) fairness motivations.8
The trick for the firm is to construct a structure and processes that solves its particular
problems by acting on the relevant motivation(s).  Consider each problem in turn.
5.1 Shirking
If the nature of production is such that shirking is the central problem, the firm
has to choose what motivation it wants to act on.  If it is self-interest, then monitoring (a
"negative" incentive devise), promotions (a positive one), or pay-for-performance or
incentive contracts (neutral) schemes would work.  Of course economists typically
propose these solutions, quite appropriately in this case.  However, if firm members hold
intrinsic motivations, then those schemes may be counter-productive because incentive
mechanisms that work on extrinsic motivation (self-interest) may crowd out intrinsic
motivations.  To the extent members would have performed the work for its own sake,
monitoring and pay-for-performance may actually decrease overall effort as members
                                                
8   Obviously there are a myriad of both problems and motivations firms have to contend with, but the lists
here are longer than in most efforts.
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perceive the locus of control being shifted away from them.  To act on intrinsic
motivations the firm could instead institute processes members find interesting,
participatory, and ones that promote and exhibit mutual loyalty.
The firm could also choose to act on moral motivations and moral integrity by
making clear, sincere agreements with its members.  That means transparent expectations
and responsibilities, fair distributions and processes, and that members otherwise
recognize the moral standing of the firm and its other members.  Note that fairness plays
the instrumental role of eliminating the rational basis for mutual deceit.
 Fairness motivations might enter more directly.  First, fair procedures,
distributions, and interactions are associated with positive emotions, cognitions and
behaviors.  Fair organizations can expect positive worker behaviors.  Organizational
citizenship behavior is related to fairness judgements, for instance. Second, for members
who construct their identities at least in part through their employment and/or with other
members, norms of fairness sustain that identification and the resulting positive
behaviors.  In some sense to shirk in that case would be to harm oneself.
5.2  Transfer of Knowledge
As mentioned earlier, I take the transfer of knowledge problem to be similar to the
shirking problem of withholding effort.  The problems are equivalent if knowledge
transfer is routine and a monitoring unit (or principal) could know what each member
should be doing.  If that's the case, then all of the solutions discussed in the last section
pertain here as well.
Knowledge transfer could pose problems for the monitoring solution if member
contributions were all different.  Even if transfers were routine, the complexity could
prove too costly or difficult for a monitor to effectively mete out sanctions.  Of course the
same could be said for production processes that require different kinds of effort
contributions.  Even still, carefully constructed incentive contracts, promotion schemes,
and profit-sharing could prove sufficient to motivate self-interested members to perform.
Added complexity should not similarly effect the other solutions.  For instance,  for the
case of integrity it would not matter if member performance could be externally
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monitored or not, so long as members know what they should be doing and if they view
their agreements as having moral weight they are obligated to keep their agreements and
perform.
5.3  Sharing or Eliciting New Knowledge
The final problem concerns the elicitation of ideas, new knowledge.  Monitoring
is  powerless because managers could not direct or instruct firm members to have ideas.
This is the case most relevant for Osterloh, Frost and Frey (2002) because they focus on
knowledge assets that are largely tacit.  But the tacit feature of the type of  knowledge to
which they refer means that managers could not monitor because one cannot instruct on
what one doesn't know.   This is the case I draw out at length in Minkler (1993a and
1993b).
In contrast, positive incentives could work if those contributing ideas are so
motivated and if the value of individual ideas and contributions to knowledge can be
measured and accurately apportioned.  Bonuses, promotions, and profit-sharing schemes
could all qualify.   The caution about extrinsic incentives crowding out intrinsic
motivations remains relevant.
On the minimalist interpretation, the relevant class of moral principles has to do
with not breaking agreements.  But it is not clear how an organization could exact an
agreement with its members about generating and then sharing ideas.  The problem is that
ideas form the most intimate aspects of ourselves which no universal moral principle can
obligate us to surrender.  Agreements about ownership of ideas once they've been
introduced are certainly possible and quite common.  But there is no moral imperative for
members to contribute them in the first place.  Thus, perhaps surprisingly, I do not find a
case for moral motivations or moral integrity solving the knowledge sharing problem.
Processes working on intrinsic motivations could prove successful.  If members
enjoy innovating for its own sake, and if the work processes are supportive, there is
reason to share.  Organizations confronting the knowledge sharing problem would benefit
from screening for intrinsically motivated members.
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It is more difficult to assess the likelihood of success of organizational solutions
focusing on fairness motivations.  We know that fair organizations can expect positive
worker behaviors.  The question is whether innovative behavior qualifies in the sense that
members feel that fairness necessitates it.  Given the elements of organizational
citizenship behavior, it seems clear that the generation of new knowledge is beyond its
scope.  However, if fairness fosters member identity with the organization then it might
also promote innovative behavior.  Such members contribute because it is good for the
organization, which in some sense is to say good for themselves.9
If the preceding is correct, three important points stand out.  First, well
constructed schemes working on self-interest, intrinsic, and fairness motivations can
solve all three types of problems: shirking, knowledge transfer, and knowledge sharing.
In the case of self-interest, positive incentive schemes will be necessary to solve the
knowledge sharing problem.  It appears that moral motivations cannot solve the
knowledge sharing problem.  Second, processes working on moral motivations can solve
the shirking and knowledge transfer problems and may be an effective substitute for
schemes working on incentives for those problems.  Third, fairness not only affects
fairness motivations directly, but also moral and intrinsic motivations indirectly as well.
As such, fair organizational practices are efficient in the sense that they operate on three
different sets of motivations.  Unless self-interest can be shown to be an overriding
motivation, or that processes acing on self-interest cost less, the analysis here reinforces
the case for fair organizational practices.
6.   Conclusion
The question becomes what kinds of firm structures support the different kinds of
processes that act on the different motives.  That question has been addressed for self-
interest and shirking.  Hierarchy supports monitoring, incentive contracts, promotions
                                                
9   One motivation not considered but probably warranting further attention is a work ethic based pers nal
integrity.  Such a person would commit to and identify with a principle like "hard work is good."  Meaning
provides the reason for such a person to work hard, quite apart from moral agreements with others,
instrumental payoffs, or the degree of interest in the work itself.  This worker may share knowledge if it is
seen as a duty.  It is not clear how the firm could inculcate such a principle, except perhaps by establishing
a culture where hard work is the norm.
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and tournaments.  Of course the analysis here points to other motivations and solutions.
Still, the transaction cost literature might be right about the hazard of certain exchanges
even if it is wrong about what motivates organization members.  If members identify with
their organizations they may contribute positively.  However, that identification also
creates "others" not identified with, including other exchange partners (Kogut and Zander
1996).   If self-interest or opportunism is the dominant motivation for such transactors,
then the transaction cost literature is right to point out the hazards of asset specificity
under bounded rationality.  Once transactions occur within the scope of an organization,
however, the analysis is far less compelling because of the other motivations that come
into play.
To the extent moral motivations are important, their operation could mediate both
intra and inter organization transactions.  The possibility of clear and morally binding
agreements exists inside of and between organizations.  Any kind of organization would
seem to meet these criteria.  The key for the firm is to convince its members of its moral
standing.  Organizational fairness would achieve that purpose.  In contrast, moral
motivations do lose their force in buyer-seller relationships if such relationships are
perceived or rationalized as ones of mutual deceit.  False claims seem both rampant and
acceptable in many such settings, at least enough so that counting solely on moral
motivations would be foolhardy.
Intrinsic motivations suggest work processes that are interesting, personal, and
participatory.  One possibility is small firms or small work groups.  Small firms are
characterized by flatter hierarchies, less division of labor (so members do more kinds of
work), and relationships that are personal (more face-to-face interactions).10 Of course
smaller firms also provide less possibility for advancement.
                                                
10 The survey in Minkler (2002) provides some support for small firms.  In a previously unreported
question it was asked:
Q.  Now we want ask you about different kinds of employers including corporations, small businesses,
government agencies, and not-for-profit firms.  For which of the following are you most likely to do your
best work?
a.  Corporation.  11.2%
b.  Small Business.  25.9%
c.  Government Agency.  4.7%
d.  Not-For-Profit Firm.  10.1%
e.  No difference among them.  46.3%
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Fair organizational practices include giving members a voice, open lines of
communication, organizational support, and fair pay among others.  The first two in
particular are associated with member participation.  Participatory organizations are
inherently less hierarchical.  So that kind of structure would seem to be able to better
capture at least some elements of fair work processes.  Since fair work processes are so
important in acting on moral, intrinsic, and fairness motivations, perhaps the advantages
of non-hierarchical organizational structures has been under-appreciated.  Future research
could also investigate extreme forms of participatory organizations, labor-managed firms
and (to a lesser extent) franchises, to see if they do indeed offer high performance due to
their ability to act on a richer set of motivations.
The evidence seems clear that organization members act on a rich set of
motivations and the complex task firms confront is to manage and coordinate them
effectively.  The question is why do researchers, particularly economists, and some
organizations themselves continue to rely on the behavioral workhorse of self-interest
and its attendant incentive prescriptions?  Heath (1999) offers one clue.  In a set of one
field and three laboratory studies he finds evidence of an "extrinsic incentives bias,"
where people predict that others are more motivated by extrinsic incentives than
themselves and less motivated by intrinsic motivations.  One implication is that the bias
leads managers and principals of organizations to enact work processes that operate on
the wrong motivation.  Perhaps it should be added that researchers need to be mindful of
the bias as well.  But while it might be somewhat difficult for transaction and agency cost
theorists to grapple with methodological realism regarding worker motivation, the time is
right for that evolution.  To their advantage, capability theories are not reliant on any one
foundational motivation and a fuller motivational mix is easily accommodated.
                                                                                                                                                
While the largest response indicated no preference, for those who expressed a preference half report they
would do their best work for a small firm.
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